Boycotts and the Labor Struggle. By Harry W. Laidler. New York. John Lane Company. pp. 488.

The extension of the boycott as opposed to its further limitation by law is one of the problems now pressing for solution. It cannot be said that there is a unanimity of opinion among economists or in the decisions of the courts as to the proper attitude to be adopted toward this form of industrial warfare. The tendency of the courts, however, is toward an emphatic restriction of the power, a position which is even bitterly assailed by the adherents of organized labor.

The author of this book considers the status of the boycott both in its legal and economic aspects. He traces the boycott to its modern form and finds that it has been applied in its most extreme cases in connection with the industrial expansion of the United States. While he is disposed to acknowledge the existence of some unquestioned evils in the boycott as an offensive weapon in labor strife, he reaches a conclusion that it gives to labor practically its only effective weapon to compel the granting and maintenance of "social justice."

In a chapter presenting reasons for legalizing the boycott, the author finds that many failures upon the part of labor to boycott successfully have been due to the activity of state militia and the construction of the law by the courts, the latter being credited with an adherence to the "conservative side", an accusation which most courts will be inclined to admit, willingly. The author sits in judgment on the rectitude and honesty of the American judiciary and finds that "many * * * are under obligation to political bosses, who, in turn, represent financial interests perhaps more or less involved in the labor struggle." This is but one of the incidental assumptions by the author which help him to the conclusion that the "legalization of the boycott is likely to reduce the number of strikes and to lead to a larger number of trade agreements. If the employer knows that the employees can cut off his sales, by the use of the weapon, he is more likely carefully to consider their demands."

It might be said, however, that notwithstanding how just or reasonable his considerations, the employer in reaching a decision adverse to the requests of his employees, would be subjected to boycott and therefore be prevented from exercising an independent judgment.

The book contains a valuable digest of decisions on the boycott and allied cases and shows clearly the present attitude of the courts throughout the United States. *M. H.*

A Treatise on the Modern Law of Evidence. By Charles Frederic Chamberlayne. Vol. IV, *Relevancy.* Matthew Bender & Co., Albany, N. Y.; Sweet & Maxwell, London. 1913. Pp. xxxv, 3471-4956.

The appearance of the fourth volume of this work marks the completion of the masterpiece in this particular branch of legal literature. While there has been no dearth of treatises on the Law of Evidence, some of which have been most excellent and for a time all that could be desired, the subtle distinctions characterizing this subject, together with many salient departures from certain moss-covered canons, constantly calls for re-interpretation of principles and readjustment of lines of demarcation. True, the recent work of Professor Wigmore, published in 1910, may for most purposes be said to be sufficiently recent to meet the demand for a modern treatise, but Mr. Chamberlayne has approached the subject in a manner so entirely different from that of Professor Wigmore, and in fact from that of the many other writers, that his work will probably not encroach upon the field occupied by the latter. But great as is Professor Wigmore's book, much dissatisfaction has always been felt over the difficulty of the peculiar and novel nomenclature used therein. Mr. Chamberlayne has wisely refrained from any such innovation.

As was stated in paragraph 64 of the first volume, the intention of the author is to examine the topics from the standpoint of Judicial Administration, as compared to Procedure. Following this plan, Vol. IV, the title of which is *Relevancy,* takes up the rules dealing with Hearsay, Res Inter Alios Actae, and Character. How great has been the influence of judicial tendency is manifested by the obstacles overcome, and as the author says, "The result with regard to these procedural exclusions of Hearsay, Res Inter Alios Actae, and Character Evidence may well be considered as a concession to the power of rational administration as shown in the modern law of evidence." For instance, it is by a rule of administration that unsworn statements may in recognized exceptions to the general procedural rule be admitted as secondary evidence